Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk Unpacking the role of EU incentives and third countries' preferences, this article reveals that beyond the function of this instrument to co--opt third countries in EU's fight against irregular migration, a series of obstacles forced the EU to revise the design of EURA and to take into account domestic and regional factors. This article engages with the meanings and representations carried by EURAs in third countries and implications for the logic of consequences and appropriateness within the framework of EU external migration policy.
Introduction 1
This article analyses the politics of instrumentation of EU Readmission Agreement (EURA) social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society '. 3 This necessarily implies looking at the issues of power and appropriateness of EURA as external migration policy instruments.
In nature, EURAs are both agreement and incentive--based policy instruments. As a bilateral agreement their purpose is to return irregular migrants. Third countries readmit their own nationals and third country nationals having transited through their territory. 4 The Council opens EURAs negotiations on the basis of a recommendation from the Commission. After several rounds of negotiations, the Commission as lead negotiator issues a proposal to the Council to adopt the decision authorizing the signature of the EURA by qualified majority voting.
5
The European Parliament needs to give its assent. In the third country, EURA can be ratified by Parliament, depending on the domestic constitutional arrangements.
EURAs' negotiations take place in a multi--level governance setting both within the EU and with third countries, challenging the traditional state--centric approach to public policy instruments. 6 Originally, readmission agreements at national level date back to the 19 th century 7 and have been widely used after the WWII. After the Amsterdam treaty, EU member states delegated this competence at EU level. It aroused a lot of attention in the 3 Lascoumes, P. and P. Le Gales, (2007) . Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through its InstrumentsFrom the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation. Governance 20(1), pp. 1--21. 4 The third--country nationals clause is the most polemical clause of the agreement with third countries which need to be process the detention and return of those non--nationals, therefore perpetuating the chain of readmission. Administrative capacities but also strong legal systems should ensure the safe and humane detention. 5 Article 79.3TFEU and 218TFEU. 6 Kassim, H. and P. Le Galès (2010 literature given the turf wars it generated between the European Commission and EU member states. 8 Compromising on a shared competence, the Commission 'has not withdrawn its claimed on exclusivity'. 9 It is regularly in conflict with the Council, which since Lisbon has reasserted its ultimate political role over JHA issues such as visa liberalization.
10
Negotiations and implementation of EURAs with third countries are also often undermined by EU member states' informal bilateral readmission mechanisms. Those 'non--standard agreements' take the form of memorandum of understanding and letters of exchange with third countries. Allowing for flexible and informal readmission, they fall outside parliamentary and/or judicial scrutiny 11 and undermine the credibility of EU readmission policy as well as human rights and international protection guarantees. 12 EURAs are also incentive--based instruments coupled with migration, border management operational and financial support, visa facilitation/liberalization or mobility partnerships (MP). Cabo Verde reformed its drug--trafficking and irregular migration policies. 20 In Albania, institutional and procedural changes enabled to enforce the third country nationals clause. 21 Building on the above--mentioned work, this article analyses the politics of instrumentation of EURA from a third country perspective, notably at the level of negotiations. Turkey and Morocco account for a most different systems research design as they display important differences in their relationship to the EU and in their political, social and economic systems.
Yet they share a similar hard bargainers position and a recent shift in EURA negotiations. Third, due to the regional nature of migratory fluxes though (see editorial), it is also necessary to analyse the broader regional power dynamics of EURAs negotiations. The third hypothesis is: H3 The higher the costs for the regional position of the third country, the more difficult the EURA.
Fourth, the domestic appropriateness of EURAs in the third country is relevant. In the sociological tradition, actors engaged in a negotiation can be socialized to EU norms such as the concept of 'circular migration' and the 'control of borders'. EURA negotiations can lead to 'persuasion' and 'socialisation' strategies to politicize or depoliticize EURA as a policy instrument and impact its appropriateness at domestic level. 32 This requires looking at the public debate; the media and the discourse of policy--makers at home in order to understand which norms are being seen as appropriate. EURA negotiations can lead to 'intense (discursive) struggles and re--produce meanings, subjects and resistances'. H4 The more appropriate is EU external migration policy in the eyes of a third country, the higher are the chances of the EURA to be signed. 
EURA negotiations with Morocco

EU incentives' evolution over time
Very early on, high--level Moroccan officials were concerned of being the 'Gendarme' on behalf of the EU and still continue to do so. existing readmission agreement' were raised. Morocco also had the 'impression of imbalance in the Action Plans and the countries at which the plans are directed feel that they are the target of unilateral policy by the Union focusing on repressive action'. 45 
Domestic and Regional Context: the politicization of EURA
Beyond EU incentives, domestic veto players and regional dynamics are also key in driving
Morocco's preferences on the EURA negotiations. Rather, interviews reveal that two main regional concerns have driven Morocco's position in negotiating with the EU. First, a key concern is that the EU has been unsuccessful to secure EURA with Cotonou countries, therefore fearing to become the country of return by proxy for African countries refusing to reaccept their nationals. This evidences the importance of the perception and image of Morocco amongst its regional partners. As Interviewee C puts it 'Morocco wants to be the best student amongst ENP neighbours, but does not want to be the worst student vis--à--vis its African partners either'. Morocco wants to continue to have good relationship with its African partners and avoid any kind of accusation by Algeria, which vetoes its accession to the African Union and with whom relations are poisoned by the Western Saharan conflict. This regional dimension pushed Morocco to influence the EU to adopt a more comprehensive and regional approach in its migration instrument. This regional consultative process, by focusing on intergovernmental operational cooperation and the exchange of best practices is believed to favour trust and cooperation in an area "characterised by great uncertainty in a high degree of policy interdependence". 86 The Rabat Process enabled Morocco, confronted to a high degree of uncertainty, to find more networking opportunities and to influence the Global Approach to
Migration at the Hampton Court EU Summit. 87 At the same time, it helped to forge its regional leadership role vis--à--vis African partners in the field of migration management.
Morocco displayed a strong preference for information--based and operational support via a Regional Consultative Process, which favours practical cooperation instead of the EURA.
Concerns vis--à--vis other regional partners remained constant demands of Moroccan officials.
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They are reflected in the June 2013 Political Declaration on the MP which specifies that the EURA negotiations should be accompanied by ' the promotion of active and efficient cooperation with all regional partners will be essential in order to support efforts in this area'. 89
Interim conclusion
The analysis of EURA--Morocco negotiations confirms our first hypothesis. Since financial incentives were not enough and in the absence of credible EU incentives under the form of 
EURA negotiations with Turkey
The opening of accession negotiations in October 2005 was one of the most controversial EU decisions. In spite of the initial opposition of Austria and Cyprus, the EU was confronted to a 'normative entrapment' to consider Turkish application, with no valid reason to oppose it. 90 The European Commission also 'certified that Turkey had made significant progress in that once the roadmap negotiations started, 'it is highly likely that it will be completed '. 108 This was the case with five Western Balkans that opened negotiations with a roadmap in 2000, leading to visa liberalization three years later.
109
Yet, it seems that Turkey feels different from other candidate countries, rightly so for having been discriminated in the past.
The roadmap specifies that 'progress in the visa liberalization process should be founded on the performance based approach and conditioned on effective and consistent implementation by Turkey of those requirements vis--à--vis the EU and its Member States'. 110
The main elements include mobility of bona fide travellers; improving border management Reforming Turkish visa policy would be an economic challenge but could also undermine its regional position, which would suffer from EU requirements on visa, and 'would not be good for business '. 118 Turkey, fearing to have to readmit non--Turkish nationals, has adopted a 'delaying tactic' vis-- Hence the liberal visa--free policy is matched by the same conditionality than the EU is applying to Turkey through the EURA.
Turkey has signed formal readmission agreements with Greece ( The detections at the border crossing between Greece in Turkey have declined significantly since 2010. 128 Frontex conducted several of operations on the Turkish/Greek border including the Poseidon Joint Operation at the sea border but also land operations to identify irregular border crossings. Several cases have revealed that migrants were also using lorry transports to enter the EU, for instance from Turkey to Slovakia or to Bulgaria and Romania. 129 The Eastern migratory route is also used for smuggling of cigarettes and for all 
Conclusions
The study of Morocco and Turkey in EURA negotiations reveals that beyond EU incentives, broader domestic and regional political dynamics are key to the study of the politics of EU migration instrumentation. There is also a need to differentiate between an official discourse of 'hard bargainers' and the practice of readmission, which reveals that EURA negotiations have structured Morocco's and Turkey's migration cooperation with the EU.
Our most dissimilar system research design evidences that beyond the relevance of EU 135 UNHCR (2013). 2013 UNHCR country operations profile -Turkey. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi--bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48e0fa7f&submit=GO UNHCR (2013b). 2013 UNHCR regional operations profile --North Africa. Accessed on 13 April 2013 at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45ac86.html incentives, the differential empowerment of domestic veto players combined to regional factors are key to explain what drives third countries' preferences and negotiations strategy on the EURA. The appropriateness of EU policies in the eye of third countries is however tactically played out in official discourse, but does not hold as a strong factor in practice.
Linking back to the debate on EU migration policy instruments, this article corroborates that EURA are not functional instrument set in stone, which respond to EU's migration policy rational needs. Rather, further research might look into how EU migration instruments are being structured by a complex process of politicization and (de) politicization dynamics, involving not only EU actors but also third countries. Politicization dynamics include EU turf wars between the Commission and EU member states. Reluctance from EU governments to lift up visa requirements for Turkish citizens is indeed driven by electoral concerns and a fear that asylum--seekers application would increase. 136 Yet, with the Western Balkans the EU was able to suspend visa--free regime. In April 2013, the European Parliament has indeed given its approval to provisionally suspend visa--free regime for countries like Serbia and Macedonia that are thought to abuse the asylum application system in Germany, the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg and Belgium. 137 As explained by Sander Luijsterburg, from the Dutch Permanent Representation, 'readmission and return policy' are key to 'help to win public support for other parts of migration policy'.
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The Commission strategy to de--politicize More generally, beyond the case of Turkey and Morocco, this analysis calls for a reflection on EU migration policy instruments over time as complex political and cognitive processes.
As social and political institutions, they structure power relations both within the EU and in relation to third countries. They do not always respond to the original intended effect and can escape the objectives assigned to them. This is specifically reflected in most of our interviews, which revealed an emerging debate on the very relevance of EURA as migration policy instruments. While Commission officials raised the validity of third country clauses, member states officials' views included withdrawing some of the EURA mandates given to the European Commission.
